SYRIANS IN TURKEY: SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE AND INTEGRATION RESEARCH

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HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY MIGRATION AND POLITICS RESEARCH CENTRE

Executive Summary & REPORT

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This study titled “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration” was conducted between January-October 2014. Humanitarian plight, which emerged through this unmatched, great crisis, and the debates on the culture of acceptance and integration in Turkey comprise the core of the study. Furthermore, the social experience of the Turkish migrants who went abroad in masses half a century ago provided diversity in the debates here. Considering the immensely dynamic, multidimensional and complicated nature of the process, the study has been conducted as comprehensively and detailed as possible. Rather than the theoretical framework and the debates over the issue, this study prioritizes analysis of the data from the decision-makers and specialists directly in the field through the application of different scientific methods.

It is essential to ensure the sustainability of the goodwill and sacrifice demonstrated by the Turkish people who host the Syrian refugees forced out of their homes with numbers exceeding 1,565,000 by October 2014. In this study, which aims to reach the clues of peaceful coexistence, either in “temporary” or “partially permanent” forms, a team of 11 researchers from the HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY MIGRATION AND POLITICS RESEARCH CENTER has conducted in-depth interviews in 6 provinces to discover the conditions of and problems faced by refugees in Turkey and, additionally, in October 2014 survey research has been conducted in 18 provinces with 1501 people to reveal a general picture of the level of “social acceptance” regarding the issue of Syrians in Turkey.

Many thanks for their contributions to our researchers Assist. Prof. Dr. Elif UZGÖREN and Assist. Prof. Dr. Ayselin YILDIZ, Arda AKÇİÇEK, İdil AKINCI, Deniz AYDINLI, Selin ÇAKAR, Tuğçe ÇETİNKAYA, F. Mine GÜLTEKİN, Eda SEVININ, Buket TENEKE, who participated in the team and put enormous effort in discovering basic findings of this research. Moreover, I thank Optimar, which conducted the survey research with great pace and devotion, and its Chair of the Board Mr. Hilmi TAŞDEMİR in particular.

This study has been conducted with the support of Hacettepe University, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Turkey and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung-Turkey. In that regard, I express many thanks to the Dean of Hacettepe University Prof. Dr. A. Murat TUNCER, Chief of Missions for IOM in Turkey Meera SETHI and Head of the KAS office in Turkey. Dr. Colin DÜRKOP.

I thank the President of Disaster & Emergency Management Presidency Dr. Fuat OKTAY, Director General of the Directorate General of Migration Management Atilla TOROS, Governor of Gaziantep Erdal ATA, Governor of Kilis Süleyman TAPSIZ, Coordinator-Governor of the General Coordinatorship of Syrian Refugees Veyssel DALMAZ, Deputy Governor of Gaziantep Nursal ÇAKIROĞLU, Head of the Department of Response of the Disaster & Emergency Management Presidency Fatih ÖZER, Dr. Franck DÜVELL from Oxford University, Prof. Dr. Ahmet İÇDUYGU from Koç University, Metin ÇORABATIR from the Refugee and Migration Research Centre and for his kindness in sharing the photographs we used in this research Coşkun ARAL very much. I owe many thanks to the Secretary General of Hacettepe University Prof. Dr. Mehtap TATAR, Prof. Dr. Kemal KİRİŞÇİ from The Brookings Institution, Meltem ERSOY and Mazen ABOULHOSN from IOM, Rahmi VARDI and Ahmet Hamdi AYAN from HAYAD Association, contributions of whom must be mentioned. I also thank Prof. Dr. Ayhan KAYA and Bilgi University Press Editor in Chief Fahri ARAL for their contributions in transforming this report study into a book. I especially thank my dear wife Dr. Armağan ERDOĞAN and my daughter Rüya for their support, encouragement and patience in the process.

Surely, what is worthy of the most praise is the people of Turkey who have been hosting and trying to support one and half million Syrians for the last 3.5 years.

Assoc. Prof.. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre-HUGO, conducted comprehensive research on the social acceptance and integration of Syrians in Turkey, who escaped from the initial conflict and subsequent civil war, which is ongoing in their country since April 2011, and sought refuge in Turkey within the framework of the “open doors policy” and are provided with “temporary protection”, whose number has exceeded 1.6 million since November 2014. This comprehensive study, which was managed by the Director of HUGO Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan with a research team of 11 people in an 8 months period with the application of various scientific methods, is focused on the social acceptance and integration perspectives of this severe and multifaceted crisis faced by Turkey and the world. This study’s aim is to understand both Turkish and Syrian societies and make predictions for developing sound public policies. In the framework of this study, it is intended to reveal the current conditions, properties, levels of satisfaction, problems and attitudes towards the permanence of Syrians in Turkey, synchronously with Turkish society’s opinions, expectations and problems regarding Syrian refugees.

In this study, between February and March 2014, a total of 144 people divided in half as 72 locals and 72 Syrians from Gaziantep, Kilis and Hatay on the borderland and Istanbul, İzmir and Mersin out of the borderland were subject to an in-depth interview; while separate survey research titled “Syrian Perception in Turkey” was conducted with a sample of 1501 people from 18 provinces. Additionally, media analysis was made with the internet news, commentaries and assessments of 21 general/national and 56 local media institutions; contacts were arranged with 38 national and international NGOs working on the subject in and out of the region in which their works were assessed and further meetings took place with the managers of almost every associated state agency and local authorities; and moreover, the abovementioned studies were analyzed in an international workshop at Hacettepe University by the field experts and high profile authorities, the results of which are assessed in this report as well.

1 Study headed “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration” will be published in detail as a book by Bilgi University Press in December 2014.
After the dissident protests against the regime that started in March 2011, developments in Syria have emerged as one of the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world. As of November 5th, 2014, there are more than 1.6 million Syrians present in Turkey in 3.5 years. Only 13% of them are sheltered in 22 camps in 10 provinces, while the rest of them are spread out almost everywhere in Turkey outside of the camps. More than 53% of the Syrians in Turkey are comprised of young people and children below 18 and over 75% are women and children who are in need of special care. An estimated number of Syrian babies who were born in Turkey is over 60,000.

There is significant evidence to anticipate that it will not be possible to establish peace in Syria in the foreseeable future and thus, the refugee influx is likely to continue. During this process, countries neighboring Syria, Turkey particularly, have been left alone by the prosperous-developed Western world. Foreign resources met only 200 million dollars of Turkey’s total expenditure of 4.5 billion dollars in 3.5 years, which is around 4.5%. Although they constantly express sensitivity on the “open doors” and “temporary protection” policies of Turkey, which are enforced by its own will, Western societies are far from showing sincere support. The attitude of Europe in particular is expressed as “open your eastern borders, but always keep the western ones closed so that they won’t come” raises severe ethical and conscientious concerns. While 3.5 million Syrians have been forced out of their countries, only 123,000 of them, which is 3.5%, are now admitted or committed for admission in developed countries. Turkey and other neighboring countries became the victims of universal open doors policy. Each international crisis with a neighboring country has the potential to turn into a domestic crisis. This situation may lead neighboring countries to act more cautiously and enclosed in the future and severe humanitarian tragedies and slaughters may take place.

This study reveals that despite the occasional negative attitudes more in line with racism, xenophobia and hate, the level of general social acceptance is unusually high for Syrians in Turkey. Protests and negative incidents are important signals, yet they do not disrupt the abovementioned general picture. However, this social acceptance case may not be open-ended, infinite and sustainable in its current form. The continuity of Turkish society’s exceptional social acceptance with all due financial and humanitarian sacrifices may only be
ensured through management that includes the society in the process and gains their support. “Living together with Syrians” may not be simply ensured by the discourse of fraternity. The survey research in the framework of this study reveals that there is a huge cultural gap between Turkish society and Syrians where the former is not sympathetic at all towards the conferment of citizenship on the latter. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to gather the data through scientific methods and base policies on such knowledge. Another important point is that so far state agencies have been unable to disseminate sound data. This process should be carried out more through a “rights-based” approach, considerations should pay attention to universal norms and bodies of law and more room for civil-society initiatives should be provided.

Syrians in Turkey have a growing tendency to permanently stay in Turkey. This is a natural phenomenon that is similarly observed in several other places in the world. Those who are able to fare well in the countries in which they are admitted, particularly if the conditions are worse in the country from which they originate or if that country is still under the status of war, prefer to stay in the country where they sought refuge. Although the Syrians living in Turkey state that they may eventually return if a peaceful environment is established in their country, they admit that it is becoming impossible in short and middle terms. Therefore, that a significant amount of Syrians will not turn back and permanently stay in Turkey is an evident reality. Such reality should be shared with the Turkish society, which so far has demonstrated tremendous social acceptance and their consent should be ensured. The first means of this is transparency and information sharing. In this 3.5 years duration, mistakes that emerged in almost all predictions in terms of the Syrian Regime, the number of incomers and the duration of their stay, and the lacking in the dissemination of information have resulted in growing tension in society. Turkey’s Syrian policy, which is based on temporariness, should be maintained in a way and Turkey has to make an effort both for establishing a peaceful environment in Syria and for helping Syrians return to their country. On the other hand, considering that at least 1 million Syrians are going to stay in Turkey permanently, policies of integration should be commenced synchronously. A potential increase in that number can be seen through “family reunions”. The first step in that regard is providing Turkish literacy to Syrian children and youth, which is 53% of the total number and thus increase their extremely low level of enrollment (15%). Secondly, particular efforts
should be directed to prevent local people from losing their entitlements and possible disruptions in public services, which could be caused by Syrians.

From time to time, the issue of Syrians in Turkey becomes political rather than humanitarian. This alters the attitudes of those who are closer to the government and those who are not. Even if the regime in Syria collapsed today, a new environment of war is evident there and conditions seem unlikely to change in short and middle terms. No matter who accuses whom, how, why and with whatever guilt, social reality will occur in its own platform. Due preparations should be made.

Universally, in all incidents of mass migration, the right to labor is an important dimension. The process of the right to labor should be carried out with delicacy to prevent disruptions maybe caused by Syrians in local people’s access to services. Otherwise, the maturity and social acceptance demonstrated thus far could shortly transform into hate and enmity. Day by day, it becomes harder to define Syrians as guests and it recalls the very similar experience of Turks in Europe: not of acceptance but of exclusion.

Crisis over the Syrians is one of the severest crises faced by Turkey and the world. In that regard, efforts of Turkish society and the state are extremely essential. The efforts of the authorities from the Ministry of Interior Affairs, Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency and the Turkish Red Crescent are worthy of praise. For these efforts to be sustained, it is important that criticisms should be on a constructive basis, and the excitement and efforts of those who work devotedly in the region should be encouraged and celebrated.

By the research conducted in the framework of this study:

It is revealed that **Syrians** are content and happy to be in Turkey; they feel gratitude towards Turkish society and the state; they want to return to their country when possible, yet know that such possibility is less likely day by day. Moreover, it is observed that if Turkey confers citizenship on them, they will immediately accept; they often emphasized their desire to meet their own requirements by obtaining their right to labor; they are not pleased to be defined as “guests”; they requested the abolition of the geographical reservations of Turkey
in the Geneva Convention which prevent them from being legally recognized as refugees; qualified people would like to be transferred to a third country if possible; they are discontented that their children are devoid of education; they are increasingly more sympathetic to stay in Turkey.

Here are the general findings of the survey research in 18 provinces:

- This research, which aims to measure the Syrian perception in Turkish society, reveals that social acceptance of Turkish society towards Syrians is profoundly high despite the fact that 1.5 million Syrians have been living in Turkey for the last 3.5 years, the effects and risks of which are directly reflected in daily life.
- Attitudes of society toward Syrians display a substantially “rights-based” character. For example, the proposition that “They should be sent back home even though the war is ongoing” is fiercely opposed. Moreover, instead of themes like “religious fraternity” or “neighborhood”, the primary mentality behind Turkish support is “to support those who escape from tyranny”.
- More than half of Turkish society shares the perception that Syrians will stay in the country.
- Despite the neighborhood and ethno-religious similarities, cultural proximity with Syrians is drastically low in Turkish society. In fact, a serious level of marginalization has been detected. The proposition of “I think we are culturally similar with Syrians” got a mere 17% support.
- Society is divided on the issue of Syrian labor.
- The most prominent objection of Turkish society is the conferment of citizenship upon Syrians. This is clearly opposed.
- That Syrians took the jobs of local people is a serious concern particularly within the region.
- Common thinking patterns are that new refugees should no longer be admitted; Syrians should be sheltered in the camps or held within the buffer zones.
- It is believed that serious problems may arise if Syrians stay in Turkey.
- It is a common perception that Syrians are an economic burden for Turkey.
- Some concerns are observed that Syrians may disturb peace and order.
- 30% of Turkish people expressed that they directly or indirectly supported Syrians morally or materially.
- If the attitude toward Syrians is evaluated in terms of political preferences, quite similar views are shared between the Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) and the Peace and Democracy Party-People’s Democratic Party (BDP-HDP), and between the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). When political views are determined by a response to the proposition of “Which party would you vote for if the elections were held today?” and these are associated with other...
prepositions, supporters of the AK Parti and BDP are observed to be more “protective” toward the Syrians than those of the CHP-MHP.

- It is fair to think that the issue of Kobani and the admission of Kurdish-origin Syrians in Turkey had a serious impact on the attitude of the BDP-HDP during the time in which this research was conducted.
- In the assessments, it is observed that no significant differences were detected between the provinces inside and outside the region. In case such differences go above 5%, separate evaluations are presented.

This case of extraordinary support and costs, which are endured by Turkish society and the Turkish state for Syrian refugees, and the “model” it posed should be shared with the global public. A country that has hosted 1.6 million refugees in 3.5 years, taken on expenses over 4.5 billion dollars, and its people’s rights and human based hospitality, which displayed an immensely high level of acceptance, are all worthy of praise and pride. The policy of western states, which could simply be summarized as “Open your borders in the east, but close those in the west so that they won’t come to us”, contrastingly manifests the value of what Turkey has done. However, it is equally important to make these known both for Turkey and for future waves of refugees.

It no longer seems possible to base Turkey’s Syrian policy on “temporariness”. Actions that are postponed, halted or neglected due to the expectation of “temporariness” may bring severe problems in future. Therefore, while doing what should be done through domestic and foreign policy for Syrians to return home, it is necessary to recognize that a significant proportion of them will stay in Turkey permanently and strategies of coexistence must be developed in line with that. While making strategies of that sort, a science-based approach should be embraced by utilizing the knowledge and counsel of experts, academicians, NGOs, international institutions and organizations. It is of vital importance that the strategies related to “permanence” should be human and rights based, and the support of Turkish society should be gained. It is not the time for holding someone accountable-guilty, rather it is the time for a human and rights based resolution for the sake of the future of Turkey.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre-HUGO conducted a comprehensive research study on the social acceptance and integration of Syrians in Turkey, who escaped from the initial conflict and subsequent civil war that has been ongoing in their country since April 2011 and sought refuge in Turkey within the framework of “open doors policy” and are provided with “temporary protection”, whose number exceeded 1.6 million by November 2014. This comprehensive study, which is managed by the Director of HUGO Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan with a research team of 11 people in 8 months duration with the application of various scientific methods is focused on the social acceptance and integration perspectives of this severe and multifaceted crisis faced by Turkey and the world. This study’s aim is to understand both Turkish and Syrian societies and to provide predictions for developing sound public policies. In the framework of this study, it is intended to reveal the current conditions, properties, levels of satisfaction, problems and attitudes towards permanence of Syrians in Turkey, synchronously with Turkish society’s opinions, expectations and problems with Syrian refugees.

One of the important predictions of this study is that day by day Syrians in Turkey are getting further from being “temporary” to becoming “permanent”. This study predicts that the social acceptance of Turkish society is immensely high on the issue of Syrians in Turkey though certain limitations are evident as “hospitality” may turn into “hate, enmity”, which is a potential occurrence to be taken seriously, and for social acceptance to be sustained, comprehensive migration management is necessary. Policymaking gets harder due to the fact that the issue of Syrians in Turkey is not merely humanitarian but also imbued with political aspects as well.
The most prominent pursuit of this study concerns how to handle the process and what to do for the refugee issue. Two important aspects to be taken into consideration in terms of well crisis management in Turkey are indicated in the study. First of all is the impossibility of a sound process management without registration, and the other is the necessity of synchronous strategy development for both cases of temporariness and permanence. The issue of Syrians in Turkey, even if the Syrian regime collapsed today, should be considered an issue that has potential impacts on Turkey’s prospects in the next decade. It is necessary to develop short, middle and long term strategies, which will fill the gap between the assumptions that “Soon the Syrians will return home by the end of the crisis.” and “The crisis will take longer to resolve, and even if it is granted, a significant amount of the Syrian population will stay here due to the appeal of Turkey or the dire conditions in Syria.”

Another important finding of this study is that social acceptance in Turkey is extraordinarily high despite the problems encountered, yet it is on fragile terms and for it to be sustainable, a well-managed process, e.g. making strategies of “temporariness” and permanence” is necessary, and these strategies should be brought to public attention and inspire public support. While it is almost impossible to keep the partially unguarded 911 km long Syrian border under constant control, precautions must be taken for possible newcomers as well as for those who are present.

As an institution academically specialized on Turkish-origin people abroad, this study conducted by HUGO benefited from the experiences of social acceptance, social exclusion, and integration of the Turks abroad who went to Europe for work with a one year contract, yet could not return and became permanent.
In-Depth Interviews: A total of 144 people divided in half as 72 locals and 72 Syrians from 6 provinces of Turkey—Gaziantep, Kilis and Hatay on the borderland and Istanbul, Izmir and Mersin out of the borderland—were subject to an in-depth interview.

Survey Research: Survey research titled “Perception of Syrians in Turkey” was conducted with a sample of 1501 people from 18 provinces between September-October 2014.

Media Analysis: Internet news, commentaries and assessments by 21 general/national and 56 local media institutions were examined.

NGO Analysis: Meetings were arranged with 38 different national and international NGOs working on the subject in and out of the region in which their works are assessed.

Expert Contacts: Meetings were arranged with the managers of almost every state agency and local authorities associated with the subject; moreover, the abovementioned studies were analyzed in an international workshop in Hacettepe University by the field experts and high profile authorities, the results of which are assessed in this report as well.
SYRIANS IN TURKEY: STATUS-NUMBER-FINDING

- **“Open Door Policy”-“Temporary Protection”:** Since April 2011, in alignment with what international law and conscience dictates, within the framework of “open door policy” and “temporary protection” policies, Turkey has admitted Syrians who escaped from upheaval caused by the bloody suppression of the protests opposing the Syrian regime and the subsequent outbreak of civil war. This policy adheres to the principles of international law, notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention of 1951.

- **Number of Refugees and Duration of Their Stay Could Not Be Predicted During the Process:** At the onset, the anticipated duration of stay for Syrians was 1-2-3 weeks with 50-100 thousand in number, while now it is protracted day by day. As the upheaval and state of war continue, further extension of the duration is expected. A new situation emerged after the increase in ISIS activity in Syria, which may result in an immediate influx of thousands of people toward the border as seen in the Kobani case.

- **Number of Syrians in Turkey:** As Deputy Prime Minister Prof. Dr. Numan Kurtulmuş confirmed on November 5, 2014, the number of Syrians in the country has exceeded 1.6 million. The table below illustrates the figures provided by the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency and the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which respectively shows that those who stay in and out of the camps totals 1,604,430. The figure provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on October 31st, 2014 is 1,097,740, which indicates the number of registered Syrians. The UNHCR states that weekly updated numbers under the “registered” label are received from Turkish officials. However, since sound registration has thus far been unavailable and border crossings are so frequent to/from Syria, there are a variety of claims asserting that the real number is higher or lower than provided. The General Directorate for Migration Management, which carries out the registration process, puts particular effort in concluding registrations by November 17th, 2014. When biometric registration is concluded, the precise number of Syrians in Turkey will be confirmed. However, there is no doubt that the total number of Syrians in Turkey exceeds 1 million at any rate. In this study, the number is assumed to be 1.6 million.

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• **Numbers Inside-Outside the Camps:** While 13-14% of the refugees are sheltered in 22 camps (“accommodation centers”) located in 10 provinces, the real mass of the at least 1.4 million people are outside the camps, spread across almost everywhere in Turkey besides the 9 provinces out of 81. Among those outside the camps, the highest number resides in Istanbul with 330.000 people. It is followed by Gaziantep with 253.000, Şanlıurfa with 240.000 and Hatay with 204.000 people. Kilis hosts 86.000, Mardin hosts 78.000, Adana hosts 61.000 and Kahramanmaraş hosts 60.000 Syrians. 10.000 to 50.000 Syrians are shared by 11 other provinces in Turkey.

• **Registration:** By October 31st, 2014 onward, it is stated that 1.097.740 Syrians are registered among the estimated 1.6 million. This indicates that since the beginning of November around 500.000 Syrians remain unregistered, and those who are registered is about 68%. A significant 32% is deficient. Recently, special efforts addressing the matter of the proportion of registered refugees have increased. The Ministry of Interior Affairs put vigorous effort into concluding the registrations by the end of 2014 with technical assistance from the UNHCR. The reasons behind the registration problem are thought to be that it was seen as “unnecessary” at the onset due to the expectation that “Syrians would return before long” and later it became harder to control due to the continued refugee influx, as well as an avoidance of people to be registered. The failure to register Syrians in Turkey hinders crisis management and causes problems in fulfilling the requirements of refugees and in providing them with security.

• **Children:** 53.3% of the Syrians in Turkey are comprised of people below 18, who are defined as children by the UN.

• **Women and Children:** Among the Syrians in Turkey, the number of women and children who are in need of special care is above 75%.

• **Syrian Babies Born In Turkey:** It is stated that in the 3.5 years between April 2011 and October 2014 the number of babies born in camps and the cities where camps are located is 30.000. If it is considered that the number of Syrians who live in the camps and the cities where camps are located is approximately half of the total number of Syrians in Turkey, then the total number of babies born in Turkey in 3.5 years is estimated above 60.000.
**DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIANS BY PROVINCES WHICH ARE INSIDE/OUTSIDE CAMPS IN TURKEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SYRIANS</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SYRIANS</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SYRIANS</th>
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<td>İSTANBUL</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>MERSİN</td>
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<td>ÇORUM</td>
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<td>12,524</td>
<td>TEKİRDAĞ</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>ARTVIN</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC: 2,500</td>
<td>MANİSA</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>AKSARAY</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC: 10,024</td>
<td>BITLİS</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>KÜTAHYA</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALATYA</td>
<td>8,399</td>
<td>TRABZON</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>KIRKLARELI</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC: 850</td>
<td>TOKAT</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>BARTIN</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC: 7,549</td>
<td>BOLU</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>KARABÜK</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROVINCES WITHOUT SYRIAN REFUGEES:**

TUNCELİ, BAYBURT, ARDAHAN, İĞDIR, SİNOP, KASTAMONU, ERZİNCAN, GİRESUN, GÜMÜŞHANE

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3 The data are summarized with the statements of the “DEMP” and “Ministry of Interior”. The number of people living in the camps ("accommodation centers") is derived from the DEMP. [https://www.afad.gov.tr/TR/IcerikDetay1.aspx?IcerikID=848&ID=16](https://www.afad.gov.tr/TR/IcerikDetay1.aspx?IcerikID=848&ID=16) (Accessed: October 20th, 2014). The number of outside-the-camp lives is shared by Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay as "Statement of Ministry of Interior" on August 01st, 2014. See: Habertürk: August 01, 2014: “İl Türkiye’den Suriyelilerin Sayısı:” [http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/975425-istanbulda-sariyer-nufusu-kadar-suriyeli-yasiyor](http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/975425-istanbulda-sariyer-nufusu-kadar-suriyeli-yasiyor). It is not a given fact that whether the numbers released by the Ministry of Interior includes the camp-living people. However, it is observed that the camp-living numbers are not included, thus the numbers are merged. The parts of grey in the table refer to the provinces that have camps. Hereby, the total number is located at the top, below it, with the letter of “IC” camp-livers and “OC” outside-the-camp-livers are referred. The UNHCR released that the number of Syrians in Turkey was 1,097,740 as of October 31st, 2014.
• **Education-Enrollment Rate Remains At Low Levels:** More than 53% of the Syrians in Turkey are children and youth below 18 years old. There is a serious problem about the enrollment of Syrian children since their stay was not expected to take so long at the onset and the medium of instruction is Turkish. Despite better conditions in camps, the general rate of enrolment remains at the low levels of 15-20%.

• **Change in Ethno-religious Characteristics:** In the aftermath of April 11th, 2011, the vast majority of incomers from Syria were Sunni-Arabs. However, by 2014 onward, significant variation took place in the ethno-religious characteristics of Syrian refugees, as ISIS violence intensified in the region. The arrival of many non-Sunni-Arab Syrians such as Yazidis, Armenians and Kurds validated the discourse of open doors for the sake of humanity and eased the concerns of those who perceived the arrival of Sunni-Arabs as a political move.

• **Costs and Lack of International Support:** Turkey bears the enormously high costs of Syrian refugees. Foreign support in meeting those costs is quite limited. As of August 2014, Turkey has spent more than 4.5 billion US dollars on Syrians. Furthermore, Turkish NGOs allocated 635 million dollars of financial support. Foreign support during this period remained at 233 million dollars, which is only 4.1% of the total expenses. The UN’s calls for “urgent” aid in terms of basic needs attracted very little interest from prosperous and developed countries and institutions. For instance, while the requested sum for the year 2014 was 3.7 billion dollars, the funds raised were only 50%, which is 1.9 billion. The share of Turkey within these funds is quite low as well (70 million USD for the year 2014). This is because of inadequate financial-economic capabilities of other countries as well as the political preferences of Turkey.

• **Insensitivity of International Community in Humanitarian Cost Sharing:** As they were reluctant and inadequate in sharing the financial costs, prosperous and developed countries remained even more so when it comes to sharing the humanitarian costs
(refugees). Only 2-3% of the total Syrian refugee population was admitted or committed to admission by countries other than the 5 in the region (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt). Despite the urgent and humble calls of aid, financial support was not adequately ensured. The total number of Syrians that Western countries committed to admit is 120,000-130,000 in 3.5 years. These commitments have not been entirely fulfilled.

- **Call from Western World to Turkey:** “Open Your Doors In The East Close Them In The West!” Western countries expressed sensitivity on the “open doors” policy of Turkey. However, it is observed that in the same western countries, particularly in the European Union, the majority mentality revolved around “open your eastern borders, but always keep the western ones closed so that they won’t come.”

- **Crisis Management:** Turkey has devoted enormous effort for Syrian refugees since April 2011. While a Deputy Prime Minister (Beşir Atalay, Numan Kurtulmuş, successively) specialized on the issue, “Prime Ministry General Coordinatorate for Syrian Refugees” was established and a Coordinator Governor (Veysel Dalmaz) was appointed to the post in Gaziantep by a Prime Ministry Circular dated September 20th, 2012 “in order to deal with all matters related to the coordination of state agencies concerning Syrian refugees in Turkey.” Moreover, the associated departments of all ministries keep operating in and out of the region.

- **Geneva Convention and Protocol (1951-1967):** The international obligations of Turkey on the issue of refugees are determined within the framework of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. However, Turkey’s reservation to accept only those who come from Europe as “refugees” has been a disputable issue for years. Turkey insists on the reservation in order to avoid legal obligation, despite the services that it provided regarding frequent cases of mass migration caused by acute instability in the region. However, when the fundamental rights of refugees in terms of universal principles of law and the de facto situation in the region are considered, it is pointless to maintain the geographical reservations. The Syrian crisis revealed that those reservations generate problems. Turkey should abolish the geographical reservations with a rights-based consideration. According to the 2014 UNHCR figures, Turkey awaits 170,000 refugee candidates besides the Syrians. Although that number has no significance when compared to Syrians, it will increase through its “Readmission Agreement” with the EU.
• **Law On Foreigners And International Protection (2013):** As a result of the process started in 1999, Turkey enacted the Law on Foreigners and International Protection for the first time in 2013 widely through the influence of the EU, and in the framework of that law the Directorate General of Migration Management was established in an effort to move towards a new policy that is more human and rights-based, where civil initiatives are prioritized and security oriented attitudes are partially abandoned. This law was designed bearing in mind that Turkey becomes a “target” country for irregular and mass migration day by day. It is unfortunate that the Syrian crisis took place in the same period, as this institution had just been established and was in the process of drafting internal legislation and because the Syrian crisis reached far beyond any expectation. Only after the second half of 2014 was it possible to get the situation under control.

• **Regulation of Temporary Protection:** “Regulation of Temporary Protection”, which was introduced on October 22nd, 2014, is widely affected by the Syrian crisis. The regulation also introduced the concept of “conditional refugee” for the first time together with “refugee” in association with the geographical reservations of Turkey in the Geneva Convention. The regulation did not specify a time limit for “temporary protection”, yet defined the framework of services to be provided for “conditional refugees” within the bounds of possibility. Thus, the mentality behind the regulation is not about the recognition of the “rights” of the refugees and “obligations” of the state, but rather displaying a character of “host’s support for guests in goodwill—within the scope which conditions allowed—”. Both the law and the regulation establish a basic framework, yet it is deduced that regulations allow particular arrangements for Syrians.

• **Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency** performed an earlier prior role in the process for several reasons: rapid and unexpected escalation of the crisis, assumptions of “temporariness” and the fact that migration management was only possible within the field. So long as the Syrian tendency to stay is reinforced, the Directorate General for Migration Management will gain more initiative and a different structure of policymaking will emerge. The law and the regulation also create due designs to confer main authority on the Directorate.

• Extraordinary and devoted efforts undertaken by the **state staff** working in the region or in Ankara should be appreciated and they should be encouraged to continue such outstanding behavior.

• **Syrians and Unemployment:** Turkey has hosted more than 1.5 million refugees in 3.5 years. However, analogous to many other cases of mass migration around the world, one
of the main concerns of the local people refers to the labor market. Apart from the
unrest in the society, employing people who are “helpless” and eager to work underpaid
seems advantageous to many businessperson. It is necessary for the state to provide
particular support for those who are at risk of losing their jobs. However, it is not easy to
respond to the question of whether Syrians cause Turkish unemployment. According to
2013 data provided by the Turkish Statistics Institute, Kilis, Gaziantep and Adıyaman are
the top three provinces in which unemployment decreased synchronously with
increasing capacity. These surprising numbers indicate new economic development
brought by Syrian refugees. Additionally, it is claimed that many Syrian businessmen
transferred their capital to Turkey due to the crisis, which ensured a significant amount
of foreign capital inflows.

- **Camp Standards:** There are 22 “accommodation centers”, or camps, in 10 provinces with
the capacity to hold 220,000 people. Here, Turkey rather applied the presented scenery
in the foreign camps in its own practice, which proved effective. There is even news
published by foreign media with headings like “Go See Turkey to See How to Build
Perfect Camps.” Undoubtedly though, high standards in these 6 container cities only
address a small fraction of the general Syrian problem and has received criticisms for
being a “PR” effort. Another outcome of high standards in the camps is that it may have
cased a decreased amount of support for Turkey. Comparative studies also revealed
that high-standard camps are not enough to derive satisfaction by itself.

Number of “registered” Syrian refugees provided by UNHCR as of November 20th, 2014.
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
HUGO FIELDWORK: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

- In the framework of HUGO research, 144 In-Depth interviews were conducted with 72 Turks/Locals and 72 Syrians outside the camps from 6 provinces (Gaziantep, Kilis, Hatay, Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin), which provided some important clues about the subject.

Accordingly:

- Syrian Views and Expectations:
  - Syrians expressed that they are happy and content to be in Turkey, for which they are grateful to the Turkish people.
  - The most pressing issue expressed by Syrians is about the right to labor. They stated that they desire to engage in working life and, thus, they will no longer be a burden for Turkey. In case of undeclared working, they are very likely to be exploited.
  - Despite the high standards in the camps ("accommodation centers"), which stand as an example for the world, Syrians do not prefer to reside in camps unless necessary. Major reasons for that are: the strict discipline in the camps, lack of employment opportunities, reluctant religious families who perceive life in camps as unfit for their daughters, a sense of isolation-exclusion. It generates problems for all refugees to stay in camps longer than expected. Therefore, the number of those who leave the camps after they are admitted is quite high.
  - Almost all of the Syrians who intend to return when the war is over and desirable conditions at home are ensured are quite pessimistic about it as peace is not possible to be established anytime soon.
  - Syrians expressed that if they were conferred upon citizenship, particularly in the case of dual nationality, they would admit at once.
  - One of the biggest concerns of Syrians is their children’s incomplete education. Since the medium of instruction is Turkish in Turkey, a system structured by several NGOs working in and out of the camps in which a “sorted out” version of Syrian Curriculum is thought to not fulfill the necessity. Only around 15% of Syrian children are able to receive education.
  - Syrians expressed that Turkish people embraced and hosted them very well. Still, they stated that their prolonged stay has affected their relations and emotions. Distinctively, when asked “What disturbs you most?” Syrians responded “to be called ‘guests’”. In fact, to be a guest is not a “right” but a condition, which depends largely upon the host. In line with that, by affirming the “guest” status, a host basically intends to put the guests in their place, particularly in case the visit is longer than expected.
The tendency of female Syrians in particular to permanently stay in Turkey increases daily. This is a universal development, which is similarly observed in other places in the world.

Educated and professional Syrians expressed that they want to be transferred to a country in Western Europe, or to countries like the USA or Canada. They commonly emphasize the lack of working opportunities in Turkey as a reason for that.

Another point that disturbs Syrians is the issue of “Syrian beggars” common in Turkey. Syrians claim that these beggars are not the people impoverished after coming Turkey, but rather are professional “Gypsy/Roman” beggar groups who were begging in Syria as well. They expressed that beggars had an extremely negative influence on the perception of Syrians in Turkey.

Syrians expressed discontent about the political instead of humanitarian treatment of the issue. According to Syrians, the government’s discourse causes exclusion of Syrians by other political groups.

Views and Expectations of Turks/Local people

Responses are distinct in and out of the region. In the region, three principal points emerge: increasing rents, fear of losing jobs, disruptions in receiving public services, mainly healthcare.

A massive increase in rents occurred and is a reality that makes many people victims. Local people become rather reluctant to rent homes to Syrians as well. Descriptions about Syrians being unable to pay their rents are common, causing trouble and living with excess numbers such as 15-20 people in the homes they rented as a single family.

In any case of mass migration in the world, local people are disturbed, or even prompted to xenophobia, by “losing their jobs” or “competition induced by an increased labor supply, resulting in income decrease”. This is clearly observed in the region. Among the tradesmen and industrialists, there are those who consider the Syrian presence as an opportunity. On the employee’s side, the situation seems rather unpleasant. The availability of a Syrian who will work for 300TL monthly in a bakery, instead of a local person who will ask for 1000TL for the same job increases the social tension and refusal.

From time to time, the existence of a Syrian population that exceeds that of the local population causes problems in receiving public services, particularly healthcare, in the region. Rather, this is a perception. In the research carried out by the Governorship in Kilis, which hosts more Syrians than its population, healthcare services received by Syrians is 3%. However, the appearance of

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*There are people in the region who describe themselves with their religious or ethnic identities (Arab, Kurd, Sunni, Alawite etc) instead of “Turk”. Therefore, concept of “local people” seems academically relevant.*
hospital emergency rooms filled with Syrian crowds disturbs local people and negative perceptions are reinforced by disruptions in services.

- Regarding public services, several views are observed as “Priority is given to Syrians rather than us. Sometimes we are even only able to receive services by impersonating them.”

- At the local level, Syrians are commonly identified with theft, prostitution, seizure, property damage, etc. Nevertheless, all of the studies indicated that crime rates are lower among Syrians than among locals. Still, the perception about that is inflated and negative.

- There are a lot of complaints among locals that “they are disturbed by the arrival of Syrians since everywhere is filled with thieves and bullies, while they were sleeping with open doors and windows once.”

- There is a perception among locals about the prostitution of young, impoverished Syrian women. From the data provided in this study and contact made with associated institutions, it is concluded that this is largely an exaggerated rumor. Two “sex workers” (prostitutes) we contacted in Istanbul stated that they were already in the profession back in Syria and continued in Turkey when the war broke out, and never encountered anyone who engaged in the “prostitution sector” after arriving in Turkey. A camp authority stated that they investigated a complaint about a woman who was reportedly working as a prostitute in Syria and continued in the camp, on which they took necessary measures.

- Similar claims are made about child marriages, which are common, and most of these are in the form of polygamous marriages involving several wives. This is a highly complex matter, as the marriage of 13-16 year old girls is perceived as “normal” by a large segment of Syrians. More importantly is the problem of marriages taking place on religious terms inside the families without being registered. The sphere of influence of Turkish officials is limited in terms of the legal status of Syrians. Nevertheless, serious inflations are detected about the matter of marriages made on religious terms with multiple wives or those who work as servants in houses disguised as wives. Surely, these sorts of incidents have happened, yet these are not so common as to be generalized. The number of officially confirmed incidents is extremely low.

- It is observed that the matter of young, Syrian women raises severe concerns among women in the region. Women in the region demonstrate their discontent with young, Syrian women who are thought to be under hard conditions and in a position to easily accept marriage proposals. It is observed that men in the region sometimes use it as means to oppress and threaten their wives. The existence of these men pressuring their wives by asserting “behave and obey or I will take one of these 15 year old girls from the camps as a second wife, no dowry, no grumbling from in-laws” is easily observed. Serious findings indicate that this causes discontent even depression among women to the degree that they ask for
professional help from psychiatrists-psychologists. Women in the region contacted in the framework of this study are extremely eager for Syrians to return home and expressed their discontent about Syrians through a sentiment in line with hate. Though it is a perception largely caused by men, it is a problem that should be taken into serious consideration.

- The number of people underlining the cultural gap, marginalizing the Syrians or describing Syrian presence as “trouble” is extremely high. The “Our Syrian brothers” attitude is not so common in society. Syrians are described as “People who escaped from tyranny/brutality” “People under hard conditions”, yet they are remarkably not perceived as “one of us”. This is evident in the survey research.

- It is often repeated that Syrians are “guests” and they are under the obligation to “conform”. Here it is observed that “to be a guest” suggests a concept of “restriction”.

- Local people sympathize with Syrians who are closer to their own ethnic or religious properties while excluding the others. While Arabs think highly of Arabs, Kurds of Kurds, and Turks of Turkmen. Each group marginalizes every other one.

- There are local people who put in a lot of effort in solidarity with Syrians, as many as those who are concerned and demand Syrians to leave at once. Notably, some people who said “I cannot caress my children’s heads at home when I see those people who are desperate and poor” share their bread and focus a lot of their time on providing a bit of help to Syrians.

- Significant differences are observed among the provinces. Hatay is where the highest level of tension is observed. The main reason is that the population in Hatay, mainly the Alawites, perceive the government’s Syria policy as means of “Sunnification of the region” and Syrians as “terrorists”. Erdoğan’s statement of “Our Sunni citizens were killed.” after the bombing incident in Reyhanli had a tremendous impact. Results of the local elections held on March 30th, 2014 are indicative of the reaction.

- In the beginning of 2014, there were widespread claims in the region that the government brought Syrians to have them vote in favor during the elections on March 30th, 2014. Although these claims are still evident, they no longer have so much effect.

- Out of the region, the Syrian issue is largely associated with “beggars”. In major cities, there are no serious complains about Syrians other than this “security-aesthetic” concern. As it is known, the policy of placement of beggars in camps after August 2014 produced evident results. However, this beggar issue should still be taken into serious consideration due to its security dimension and its being an element of Syrian perception that is “on Syrians’ heads.” Strict measures are widely demanded on the issue of beggars, which triggers marginalization, degradation, hatred and enmity.
In the provinces out of the region, ambiguity about the number of Syrians causes extremely inflated assumptions. Official numbers suggest that there are 30,000 Syrians in Ankara, while many people claim that it is around 200-300,000. Surely, the main problem here is the state’s communication policy, which is characterized by shortcomings in disseminating sound information. This also causes a lack of trust in the state.
The issue of Syrians in Turkey is one of the most pressing matters of the past 3 years. More than 86%, that is 1.4 million, of the Syrians whose number is reported to be 1.565.000 as of October 2014, live outside the camps within the society spread out over all regions in Turkey. In a statement by the Ministry of Interior, only 9 provinces are reported to be without a Syrian presence, while Syrians live in all other 72 provinces.\(^5\) Aside from that, another important point is the problems faced by registration. As of October 31\(^{st}\), 2014, the number of registered Syrians is 1.097.740. However, registration will be concluded in November 2014.

The issue of Syrians in Turkey has become an integral part of daily life and politics. Despite the positive picture evident in the level of social acceptance, several social incidents are observed to raise concerns. Many incidents took place, such as demonstrations demanding “Syrians Out” and direct assaults on Syrian people. Such incidents generally originate from a crime in which Syrians are associated. An important reason behind the protests in some places is the issue of unjust competition in enterprise or employment. Unless the process is well-managed, xenophobia and enmity may rapidly spread among some groups within Turkish society, which so far has demonstrated high levels of social acceptance toward Syrians and has been quite supportive of them. The attitude shown thus far is a humanitarian benefit on the side of Turkish people. However, these qualities face a serious risk of depletion. Considering the fact that Turkish society has hosted 1.6 million Syrians for 3.5 years without making problems about the 4.5 million dollars spent on Syrians, and has kept reactions limited despite unjust competition and all the security risks involved, the question of how Turkish society perceives Syrians is essential in producing future strategies.

Survey research conducted in the framework of this study with a sample comprised of 1.501 people from 18 provinces revealed the general picture of Turkey and provided an opportunity for testing the results with the findings from in-depth interviews.

The survey research of “Syrian Refugees in Public Perception” was conducted by contacting 1501 people above the age of 18 in 18 provinces between October 3rd-12th, 2014. Among those contacted, 57.7% were married, 38% were single; 49.7% were female and 50.3% male. By asking about their first language, it is intended to obtain clues about ethnic features in the survey research. Furthermore, observations were made regarding political party affiliations, age groups and differences between the provinces closer to the Syrian border and those out of the region through analysis of crosstabs. Questions are prepared in a way that will provide data assistance for the study of “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration.” There are 31 questions using a 5-level Likert item (I strongly agree, I agree, I neither agree nor disagree, I disagree, I strongly disagree), 26 of which are related directly to the subject, 5 of which are about demographic information. Research was concluded within +/- 2.5 margin of error within a 0.95 confidence interval.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces: 5 inside the region, 13 outside the region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antalya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balıkesir</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hatay</td>
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<tr>
<td>İstanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey Research is applied by Ankara-based Optimar Research Company
Here are the general findings revealed by the survey research:

- This research, which tries to measure the perception of Syrians in Turkish society, reveals that: despite the effects and risks of hosting over 1.5 million Syrians in 3.5 years, which are directly reflected in the daily life, social acceptance of Turkish society regarding the Syrians is extremely high.

- If the attitude toward Syrians are evaluated in terms of political preferences, quite similar views are shared between the Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) and the Peace and Democracy Party-People’s Democratic Party (BDP-HDP), and between the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). When political views are determined through responses to the proposition of “Which party would you vote for if the elections were held today?” and these are associated with other prepositions, supporters of the AK Parti and BDP are observed to be more “protective” toward Syrians than those of the CHP-MHP.

- It is fair to think that the issue of Kobani and the admission of Kurdish-origin Syrians in Turkey had a serious impact on the approach of the BDP-HDP during the times in which this research was conducted.

- In the assessments, it is observed that no significant differences were detected between the provinces inside and outside the region. In case such differences go above 5%, separate evaluations are presented.

- No distinct differences of perception are detected between age groups.

### 1. ADMISSION OF SYRIANS AND BASIS OF ADMISSION:

In order to measure public perception concerning the admission of Syrians who escaped from the ongoing war in Syria into Turkey as refugees, we principally tried to reach findings about the reasoning behind such admission. Here, it is remarkable that the most supported proposal with 64.4% is the one with humanitarian emphasis: “Admission of Syrians without any discrimination regarding their language, religion and ethnic background is a humanitarian obligation on our part.” Maybe an even more significant response is given to the provocative proposal asserting that “the Refugees should be sent back to their country even though the war is ongoing.” Despite the 30.6% support for this proposal by Turkish people, the rate of those who opposed and refused is 57.8%.

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The public opinion research is conducted with answering the given statements through “5 point likert scale” technique. In order to provide a general view, the option of “neither agree nor disagree” is eliminated. The options of “I strongly agree”-“I agree” and “I strongly disagree”-“I disagree” are evaluated as one.
This attitude is very important both in terms of “sensitivity towards fundamental human rights” and “social acceptance”. “Humanitarian” reasoning got stronger support when compared to “historical and geographical necessities”, “religious fraternity” and lastly “ethnic kinship”, respectively. This attitude of a society that has accepted over 1.5 million Syrians in 3.5 years could be perceived as a promising picture for “social acceptance”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositions</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admission of Syrian refugees into Turkey is an obligation that originates from history, geography of our country.</td>
<td>11,7</td>
<td>39,05</td>
<td>8,5</td>
<td>30,3</td>
<td>10,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We admitted the refugees as our religious fraternity dictates.</td>
<td>9,8</td>
<td>43,1</td>
<td>15,9</td>
<td>25,1</td>
<td>6,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian refugees are ethnic in that should be admitted.</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>35,4</td>
<td>15,9</td>
<td>31,3</td>
<td>10,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey helped and paid significant attention to the Syrian Turkmen.</td>
<td>15,0</td>
<td>51,2</td>
<td>13,3</td>
<td>14,1</td>
<td>6,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission of Syrians without any discrimination regarding their language, religion and ethnical background is a humanitarian obligation on our part.</td>
<td>14,3</td>
<td>50,3</td>
<td>12,7</td>
<td>18,3</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian refugees are not our concern. We should not be involved.</td>
<td>13,3</td>
<td>28,3</td>
<td>12,6</td>
<td>36,2</td>
<td>9,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees should not have been admitted, as this is an intervention in the domestic affairs of Syria.</td>
<td>11,0</td>
<td>30,6</td>
<td>15,3</td>
<td>35,7</td>
<td>7,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian refugees are beneficial for our country.</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>14,2</td>
<td>13,2</td>
<td>44,2</td>
<td>26,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to understand the sensitivity and determination of Turkish people regarding Syrian refugees, responses given to two crucial questions reveal the general level of sensitivity and interest. The rate of those who disagree with the proposal of “Syrian refugees are not our concern. We should not be involved” is 45.8%, while those who agree is 41.6%. Similarly, the rate of those who disagree is higher than those who agree when it comes to another provocative controller question with the proposal of “Refugees should not have been admitted, as this is an intervention in the domestic affairs of Syria.” These results demonstrate a very positive picture in terms of acceptance of refugees despite their large numbers. Although Turkish people disagree with the proposal of “Syrian refugees are beneficial for our country.”, the “humanitarian” attitude shown is remarkable. It can be deduced that the attitude shows a character of principle rather than that of opportunism.
2. HOW ARE THE SYRIANS IN TURKEY DESCRIBED?

Within the answers to the question of “Which one below best describes your opinion regarding the Syrians in Turkey?” responses of “People who escaped from persecution”, “Our guests in Turkey”, “Our brothers and sisters in religion” got 72.2% in total. Those who perceived Syrians as “People who are burden on us” or “Parasites-Beggars” got a mere 26%. The amount that perceives Syrians as “People who escaped from violence” is the highest among the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) supporters. Negative judgments are rather prevalent among the supporters of the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party).

3. ARE SYRIANS ECONOMICALLY A BURDEN?

Some basic points of tension and refusal caused by Syrian refugees are tested through several proposals. Here, it is understood that the burden on economy is particularly important for Turkish society. 70.7% of the people shared the opinion that the Turkish economy has weakened due to Syrian refugees. Additionally, those who are against providing aid for Syrians when there is poverty in Turkey comprise 67.2%. Turkish people demonstrated their objections about the money spent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositions</th>
<th>Strongly Agree %</th>
<th>Agree %</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree %</th>
<th>Disagree %</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish economy suffers from taking care of this many refugees.</td>
<td>29,0</td>
<td>41,7</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td>17,2</td>
<td>4,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When there are so many citizens in need of help in Turkey, I oppose my taxes being spent on Syrian refugees.</td>
<td>26,7</td>
<td>33,5</td>
<td>11,5</td>
<td>23,4</td>
<td>5,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. TENDENCY TO ENGAGE IN PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR SYRIANS:

Regarding the support for Syrians, findings indicate that 30% of Turkish people somehow helped Syrians by providing material-moral support; however, 68.3% remained indifferent on the issue. Considering that people who supported Syrians (30%) are intensified in the region, that amount is surely not of less significance.

Have you ever financially/materially supported a refugee in person or donated an organization/institution in so doing

![Graph showing support distribution](image)

5. RIGHT TO LABOR:

One of the most disputed aspects of Syrian refugees is their right to labor. Syrians, who were assisted by donations in Turkey or counted on their own resources for a period, stated their desire to engage in working life and make their own living as that period has extended. This increased tension among people working closer to the border regions. Occasionally, the discontent of local people who feel threatened by losing their jobs due to the influx of cheap labor is rendered into protests or even assaults. Regarding this, several propositions are offered in the survey research to measure general perceptions on right to labor. 56.1% of Turkish people agree with the proposal asserting that “Syrians take our jobs.” 30.5% disagree. In the provinces closer to region, that rate goes as high as 68.9%, which could be anticipated.
In response to the question **“Which one below best describes your opinion about Syrian labor?”** it is observed that almost half (47.4%) of the people clearly have a “negative” attitude. Local people get rather sympathetic to the idea when limitations based on occupation or duration are applied. Those who agree to grant Syrians permission to work in any occupation for an unspecified duration are a mere 5.4%. In that regard, the relation between provinces in and out of the region is remarkable. “They should not be granted work permits” got 44% in the provinces in the region, while surprisingly the same question got a higher response of 48% in the provinces out of the region. “Working in any occupation without restriction” received just 2.1% support in the region and 6.1% out of the region.
“Which one of below expresses your opinion about Syrian labor best?” (Cross: Region: IN-OUT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>In the Region (Adana, Gaziantep, Hatay, Mardin and Şanlıurfa)</th>
<th>Out Of The Region (Rest)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>44,0</td>
<td>48,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35,7</td>
<td>28,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</td>
<td>14,1</td>
<td>13,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>6,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. EDUCATION

Considering the fact that more than 57% of Syrians in Turkey are children and youth below 18 perhaps the most pressing problems to be faced in the middle and long terms is access to education. UNICEF reported that 73% of Syrian children do not attend school. This lost generation must be regained in education. Unlike the case in the right to labor, society pays greater interest in providing education for Syrian children. Despite the resistance towards admission of Syrians in Turkish universities without examination—due to the already distressed conditions of Turkish candidates—results are generally promising. 72% of people supported various sorts of education, while 27.5% raised the opinion that “They should be provided with no education at all.”

Which one below best describes your opinion about Syrian access to education in Turkey?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any kind of education including the university...</td>
<td>35,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education should not be granted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Turkish classes should be granted</td>
<td>14,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and high school education should be...</td>
<td>9,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only primary education should be granted</td>
<td>8,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only technical/vocational education should be...</td>
<td>5,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any kind of education including the university should be provided...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Survey research examined perceptions on the demonstrations and “protests” of 2014 involving assaults against Syrians, which took place in several provinces, such as Ankara, Adana, and Gaziantep.

First, it is intended to reveal the general opinion through the proposition of “Syrian refugees disturb the peace and cause depravity of public morals by being involved in crimes, such as violence, theft, smuggling and prostitution.” 62.2% of Turkish society agrees with the proposal, while those who disagree are 23.1%. The amount of agreement is doubled in the provinces of the region. As the age goes up, the rate of agreement increases.

“Syrian refugees break the peace and cause depravity of public morals by being involved in crimes, such as violence, theft, smuggling and prostitution.”

As a response to the question of “Strong reactions took place against the refugees in several cities on the grounds that some Syrian people committed crimes. What do you think about that?” it is remarkable that half of society (47.5%) thought reactions were “right” and “supported” them. Those who thought reactions were right but excessive are 26.1%, and those who thought reactions and assaults were “wrong” is 13.9%. In the provinces of the region, the rate of those who think reactions were right is 52.3%, while in the provinces out of the region that is 46.7%. The rate of those who think the reactions were right is highest among people who would vote for the MHP in an election, and the rate of those who think reactions were wrong is highest among those would vote for the BDP. In terms of age groups, those who stress on the responsibility of state and rightness of protests are located
to 55+ age group.

“Strong reactions took place against the refugees in several cities on the grounds that some Syrian people committed crimes. What do you think about that?”

| The people who reacted are right - I support | 47.5 |
| The people who reacted are right yet the reactions are excessive | 26.1 |
| The people who reacted are unjust - I do not support | 13.9 |
| It is the duty of the state to protect the rights of Syrians | 12.4 |

8. APPROACH TOWARDS THE PERMANENCE OF SYRIANS IN TURKEY

In the framework of the research headed “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration”, predictions and expectations of Turkish people concerning the stay of Syrians are examined under the general topic of “In case the war in Syria drags on, which policy should Turkey pursue?” The proposition that closely relates all the research and perception is formulated as “Syrians should be sent back to their country even though the war is ongoing.” Those who responded “I agree” and “I strongly agree” only equal 30.6% together. A greater portion of 62.8% of Turkish people expressed their disagreement with the proposal. The result is valuable and important in terms of showing the state of mind in a country that hosted over 1.5 million Syrians in 3.5 years. Interestingly, the rate of disagreement with the proposal is lower in the provinces of the region, where people face more concrete and direct problems concerning the Syrians. In terms of political party affiliations, this proposal got the lowest support from proponents of the BDP, as they opposed deportation by 80.6%. Arabic-speaking people, thus thought to be Arabs, expressed higher support for “deportation”.

When the “state of war” is excluded from the proposal and is reformulated as “Refugees are not a concern of Turkey and they should be sent back to their country.” 38.9% agree and
47.8% disagree. The “state of war” seems to be an important aspect for Turkish people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositions</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrians should be sent back to their country even though the war is ongoing</td>
<td>12,4</td>
<td>18,2</td>
<td>11,6</td>
<td>45,3</td>
<td>12,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees are not a concern of Turkey and they should be sent back to their country</td>
<td>12,9</td>
<td>26,0</td>
<td>13,3</td>
<td>38,0</td>
<td>9,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The arrival of more Syrians hereafter is perceived as negative by Turkish people as expected, yet 31.7% still support the admission of newcomers from Syria. In terms of the culture of acceptance, this rate is significant when the current situation and capacity are taken into consideration. Resistance to the arrival of new refugees is higher in the provinces of the region.

Turkish people commonly share the opinion that “Syrians who stay in Turkey may cause major problems.” The rate of those who responded “I strongly agree” and “I agree” are 76.5% in total. It is higher in the provinces of the region (81.7%). Within the political party spectrum, that view is mostly common among supporters of the MHP, followed by the CHP and the AKP, respectively, while the least concern is observed among BDP supporters. (50%)
According to these observations, the general will of Turkish people is that Syrians should not be spread all over the country, but sheltered in camps. Support for the proposal of “Refugees should only be sheltered in the camps.” is 72.6%. In the region, that demands goes up to 80.2%. A similar attitude is evident in the responses toward the proposal of “Refugees should be sheltered in camps to be built in a buffer zone on Syrian soil along the border” in which the rate of support is 68.8%, while the rate of those who are against is a mere 18.1%. The BDP proponents are widely against this proposal. The Kobani incident of September-October 2014 is thought to be in line with that. However, responses to both of these proposals indicate that Turkish people are not pleased about Syrian presence out of the camps. As it is inconceivable for 1.4 million Syrians to be sheltered in the camps, policymakers should address such sensibilities.

9. PREDICTIONS ON COEXISTENCE AND "NEIGHBOURHOOD"

Research findings have indicated a different perception than the widely referred to similarities between Turkish and Syrian people in terms of religious and ethnic properties, sharing a long 911km border. Turkish society is not so sympathetic with the idea that “We are culturally akin to Syrians”. Those who support this proposal are 17.2%. Those who think we are culturally distinct are as high as 70.8%. As is known, Syrians who arrived before 2014 were widely comprised of Sunni-Arabs. After ISIS came into equation in 2014, other Syrians, such as Yazidis (Ezidi), Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds and Alawites arrived and significant alterations took place in the ethno-religious picture. Despite little differentiation of the BDP supporters on the idea that we are “akin” to Syrians, no significant difference in perception can be reported. When compared to the 17.2% support for the “cultural proximity” proposal, assumptions expressed to explain admission of Syrians in Turkey like “religious fraternity” (52.9%) and “ethnic kinship” (42.1%) lose their relevance.
One of the important questions inquired in the research is “Would you be disturbed to have a Syrian as your neighbor?” It is observed that half of society responded “yes” (49.8%) and the other half responded “no” (50.2%). Those who answered yes were then asked “Why would you be disturbed to have a Syrian as your neighbor?” Here, the findings are remarkable. 52.3% of the Turkish people expressed that they would not be pleased to have a Syrian neighbor due to the “concern that Syrians may do harm to their family or their person.” Interestingly, that perception got higher rates out of the region, which is basically indicative of a perception problem. With a rate of 15.9%, the second most prominent reason expressed by Turkish people is that they do not feel culturally close to Syrians. When compared to those out of the region, people in the region feel slightly more distant to Syrians.
10. CITIZENSHIP

One of the striking results of “Syrian Refugees in Public Perception Survey Research” is related to the citizenship. Despite embracing Syrians, Turkish people are widely against conferment of citizenship. Support for the proposition “Refugees should be conferred Turkish citizenship” got only 10.8%. A clear refusal is expressed by 81.7%, which is an unmatched result among all cases of this research. When this is analyzed in terms of political party spectrum, it is observed that there is no significant difference in the attitudes on citizenship. Conclusion is that this could be a politically risky area which should be taken in consideration for developing policies of integration in future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugees should be conferred Turkish citizenship</th>
<th>Inside the Region (Adana, Gaziantep, Hatay, Mardin, Şanlıurfa)</th>
<th>Outside the Region (Other Provinces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>5,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>7,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>36,9</td>
<td>38,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>44,8</td>
<td>46,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. VIEWS OF TURKISH SOCIETY CONCERNING THE PERMANENCE OF SYRIANS

Through several proposals in the survey research, the study titled “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration, has attempted to explain Turkish people’s opinions of coexistence and predictions on the prospects of over 1.5 million Syrians who have been in Turkey for 3.5 years by now. As a first step, Turkish people’s perceptions of Syrian permanence is investigated. Findings are striking on “the aftermath of the war in Syria”. It is reported that 45.1% of Turkish society expect all Syrians to return home. The remaining 54.9% think that Syrians will stay in Turkey either partially or wholly. This means that more than half of the Turkish society believes that Syrians will stay in Turkey in some way or another.
Currently there are over 1.5 million Syrian refugees. Which one below best describes your opinion regarding the return of Syrians to their country in the aftermath of war?

![Bar Chart]

It should be emphasized that opinions here display no significant distinction between provinces in/out of the region, political affiliations or age groups.

The expectation regarding the permanence of Syrians is of vital importance for the prospects of coexistence. In line with that, strong support for the proposal of “Syrian presence in Turkey may cause severe problems” is noteworthy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositions</th>
<th>Strongly Agree %</th>
<th>Agree %</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree %</th>
<th>Disagree %</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrian presence in Turkey may cause severe problems.</td>
<td>38,5</td>
<td>38,0</td>
<td>7,0</td>
<td>14,0</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe that Syrians will be integrated into Turkish society.</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>17,2</td>
<td>12,6</td>
<td>40,8</td>
<td>26,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees should be provided countrywide residence and policies should be developed addressing their employment and integration.</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>32,8</td>
<td>14,9</td>
<td>30,7</td>
<td>16,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population increase through Syrians will lead Turkey to be a stronger country.</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>10,6</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>42,3</td>
<td>35,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expectations regarding Syrians being integrated into Turkish society are on quite limited levels. A related proposal had a similar amount of support as the “cultural proximity”
question. A serious segment of Turkish people (66.9%) does not believe that Syrians would be integrated into Turkish society. In terms of integration, the AKP (27.8%) and BDP (35.6%) voters are rather hopeful.

The proposal formulated as “Refugees should be provided countrywide residence and policies should be developed addressing their employment and integration.” had 38.2% support. However, a larger amount of 47% thinks that integration strategies are unnecessary. This is the result of demoralization and a lack of hope in society.

The increasing Syrian population in Turkey sometimes triggers claims that this is a deliberate state policy on demographics. A proposal was formulated regarding the possible association between Syrians and President Erdoğan’s frequently expressed request to produce “3 children” as a condition to form “a strong state”. However, the proposal that a “Population increase through Syrians will lead Turkey to be a stronger country.” had little support (12.3%). The rate of those who disagree with the idea that the contribution of Syrians will lead to a stronger state is 70.6%.

12. SOCIAL SENSITIVITY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The proposal that “Turkish people embraced Syrian Refugees” was asked in order to reach evidence on the interest and support for Syrians in Turkey, as this proposal had enormous support of 79%, where the rate of those who disagree is only 9.8%. This indicates that Turkish people think “they did their part”.

An important aspect of the Syrian crisis is its management. The proposition of “The state displayed efficient management concerning the refugees.” was included in the research
survey in order to understand the perception of society on crisis management. 31.8% of Turkish people agree with the proposal, while 49.7% are dissatisfied. Here, there is a huge gap between those who vote for the AKP and those who do not. Also, the approach regarding state performance is rather negative in the region than out of it.

“State displayed an efficient management concerning the refugees.”
MEDIA ANALYSIS

Media scanning conducted as part of the study of “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration” is a content analysis of news and commentaries about Syrian refugees that are published in the websites of general (national) and local newspapers in Turkey. The way the newspapers evaluated the concept of refugees, how they approached the issue of Syrian refugees, which aspects they prioritized in their news and commentaries in terms of social acceptance and integration was examined in this context. Other than the 21 general/national newspapers, 56 local newspapers were scanned from 10 provinces (Adana, Adıyaman, İstanbul, İzmir, Gaziantep, Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, Mersin and Şanlıurfa) where Syrian refugees are dense in number.

In a country where 1.6 million refugees arrived in 3.5 years, the media’s interest seems to be extremely limited to the extent of “indifference”. Turkish media preferred an approach that prioritized incident-based publishing. Naturally, the local media were more involved in the issue, yet news-incident based publishing was prevalent in their approach as well. National media determined the priorities of news related to Syrians based on their relation with the government. Emphasis was frequently placed on “putting Syrians in their place”, as suggested by the description of “guest”. Moreover:

• Despite the benefits of an increased number of news articles published about the refugees and promotion of the notion of refugees in public debate, much of the media effort, local or national, was focused on exposing the vulnerable conditions and poverty of the refugees or their involvement in crime. In 2014, “Go Home Syrians!” type demonstrations in Ankara, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş and Adana were included.

• Consequently, refugees are depicted on the one hand as vulnerable, weak and poor people, and on the other hand as fugitives, criminals, thieves, murderers, rapists, susceptible to crime and a burden on the country, shaping the due public perception.

• It is understood that the conditions of refugees and aid provided for them takes precedence in news in general newspapers, while some newspapers quite noticeably focused on actual/possible problems caused by refugees.

• Common problems mentioned are: crimes involved with refugees (assault, theft, smuggling, prostitution, harassment) and the assumption that they have higher...

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8 General review of the media analysis is located in the book (see: footnote 1).
susceptibility to crime, fear of epidemics, their being a cause for high public expenditure, their being beggars, their revolts in camp cities, their women being second-wives and the psychological impact of this on local people, increased rents and them being preferred as cheap labor.

**NGO ANALYSIS**

NGOs in Turkey that place importance on Syrian refugees are differentiated within themselves in terms of their motivation, areas of service, elements of service, professionalism, relations with the state and relations with international institutions and organizations. It is observed that faith-based NGOs have thus far been the most active in support of Syrians, while rights-based NGOs particularly helped through assistance from international institutions and organizations. Moreover, several activities involve trade associations and labor unions as well as the provincial associations of political parties. Some of the NGOs only operate in the region, while others are active in the provinces out of the region as well. Some of the NGOs also engage in activities inside Syria. NGOs are very different in terms of their level of professionalism. There are those with an international network and a lengthy history and experience in the area, and those that are newly established, small-scale and mostly active through personal efforts. Although it is still far from what it ought to be, the motivation, effort and performance of these NGOs is promising.¹⁰

The involvement of NGOs in the process is essential in terms of crisis, possible problems to be faced in the future and development of civil society. Areas of activity for international NGOs should be widened. NGOs should be provided with sound data and information transmission.

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⁹ General review of NGOs analysis is located in the book (see footnote 1).

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY MIGRATION AND POLITICS RESEARCH CENTRE (HUGO) was established in 2011. Day by day, as it becomes one of the most pressing issues faced by the world, HUGO conducts research on migration and transnational migration in particular, as well as specializes in the over 6 million Turks abroad. The 50 years history of around 5 million migrants of Turkish origin is very important in terms of their progress and problems encountered as well as Turkish foreign and domestic policy. With a large multidisciplinary staff, HUGO conducts survey research, presents reports, organizes panels-symposiums-congresses, takes part in activities, such as exhibitions, TV programs, etc. regarding a wide range of subjects and themes like integration, media, identity, Europeanization, Islam-Islamophobia, Image, Politics, Civil Society, Economic Activities, Security, Discrimination, Language, Religion, Demographic Developments. Hugo also conducts studies on mass migration movements inside Turkey, which became a target country for transnational migration.

HUGO RESEARCH (selected):

- 2014- “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration” (COLLAB with IOM and KAS)
- 2013- EURO-TURKS-BAROMETER: Survey Research conducted with a sample of 2634 people from 11 European countries where 90% of the Turk reside. This study will be repeated annually. (next: December 2014)
- 2013 – Political Behavior and Preferences of German Citizens of Turkish Origin in Bundestag Elections Research
- 2013- Turkish Media in Europe Research
- 2012- Actual Views and Opinions of People of Turkish Origin in France Research
- 2011- Turks in Germany in light of the Data of “Racist Neo-Nazi Killings in Germany: Turkish Views and Sentiments” Research

HUGO SYMPOSIAIUMS (selected):

- 2014: International Workshop on Syrians in Turkey
- 2014: Turkey and International Migration(in collaboration with Oxford Uni. COMPAS)
- 2013: Migration, Islam and Multiculturalism in Europe (Ankara)
  Under the mandate of the Presidency of Turkish Republic (in collaboration with IOM, UNESCO, T, OXFORD Uni.)
- 2012: International Symposium of Migration in Turkey and the World with Gaziantep Univ.
- 2012: European Turks International Symposium (In collaboration with IOM, KAS)

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